There’s this mistaken—somewhat romantic, if you will—idea that ransomware is “IT stuff”: a few servers in trouble, a couple of sleepless nights, then you restart and it’s over…
The reality, especially for a listed company or one with bank credit lines, is simpler and harsher: ransomware doesn’t just encrypt files, it encrypts trust. When trust drops, credit becomes more expensive, shorter, and more “unpredictable.”
S&P Global Ratings clearly states that the increase in attacks and the possibility of a rapid deterioration of the credit profile after a cyber incident are relevant factors in their assessments. (S&P Global – Cyber Risk in a new era)
When we talk about creditworthiness, the question is always the same: are you still able to pay principal and interest without issues?
Ransomware impacts exactly the “banking levers”:
To put it simply… it’s not (just) a technical issue. It’s a cash flow issue.
Ransomware often doesn’t “kill” the company. It takes it offline. Offline from a liquidity standpoint means something very simple: cash stops coming in while expenses keep going out.
A useful example (even if in a different sector) is an analysis by the Office of Financial Research (OFR) on the Change Healthcare case, which highlights how a cyberattack can interrupt payment flows and create cascading liquidity stress across many entities dependent on the affected service. (Office of Financial Research)
So yes: you can have great margins on paper. But if you don’t collect for weeks, the bank starts asking very “unpoetic” questions about your reliability.
Covenants are contractual agreements or pacts, often included in bank financing, through which a company commits to respecting specific obligations and/or prohibitions, measurable through financial ratios (e.g., debt-to-equity ratios) or corporate behaviors (e.g., not distributing dividends), to protect the lender from insolvency risks and guide the company toward prudent management, with consequences (such as the right to early repayment) in case of violation.
Here comes the fun part (for the bank, not for you as a company). After a serious incident, two classic dynamics kick in:
A) Numbers worsen … you risk breaking covenants
If downtime and extraordinary costs crush your earnings, typical ratios (leverage, interest coverage) can fail, triggering new conditions and new guarantees with banks.
B) Right when you need the credit line, the line becomes more “selective”
A study by the European Central Bank (ECB) on covenant violations in credit lines shows that, after a violation, banks can restrict line usage by raising spreads, shortening maturities, tightening covenants, or even canceling/reducing the line. (European Central Bank)
In short, the credit line is a safety belt. But if you pull it too tight, you run out of air.
For a listed company, a ransomware incident also becomes a matter of:
And watch out: creditors react too. There’s literature indicating effects on debt value: for example, a study published in the Journal of Financial Stability reports bondholder losses in the order of ~2% within one month after a cyber attack (in the analyzed sample). (Science Direct Article)
Ransomware = highest probability of credit impact because it most easily creates operational discontinuity. Moody’s, in a recent outlook report, also emphasizes that ransomware typically has the greatest credit impact due to the “severe disruption” it can cause. (moodys.com)
When “disruption” is not theoretical but real, you see effects on outlook and risk perception. A very concrete (and now famous) case is the chain of consequences following the cyberattack that hit Jaguar Land Rover in 2025: production halted, gradual recovery, and agency attention on the recovery path. (Reuters)
Banks have growing incentives to measure ICT risk because they too are under stricter requirements: the EBA, for example, mandates the application of harmonized ICT risk management requirements under the DORA directive from January 17, 2025. (eba.europa.eu)
…And in Italy the message is getting louder: Banca d’Italia published, just a few days ago, a paper proposing a cyber vulnerability indicator for non-financial companies, precisely because this topic can enter risk assessment. (Banca d’Italia)
In parallel, the institutional focus links cybersecurity to system stability and service continuity. (Banca d’Italia)
It’s not all over when you turn the servers back on…
What to do to avoid turning a cyber incident into a credit problem?
Before (preparation “bank-proof”)
After (anti-panic management)
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