An increasingly pressing question is emerging in the United States: after a long series of bans, restrictions, and closures against China, how will the country guarantee the supply of batteries and strategic materials essential to power data centers, military drones, and autonomous systems used in the defense industry?
At the heart of this uncertainty is the control of rare earths, elements fundamental to the contemporary technological and military economy.
The issue returned to the forefront on November 5, 2025, during the summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and then-US President Donald Trump, which concluded in South Korea. The highly anticipated meeting led to a temporary easing of trade tensions: Beijing lifted its ban on rare earth exports, while Washington partially reduced tariffs on Chinese products.
The decision confirmed the strategic importance of rare earths in relations between the two powers. In a global context marked by growing geopolitical risks, China maintains a dominant position along the entire supply chain, from extraction to refining . For this very reason, Trump has promoted the idea of an alternative industrial network supported by the United States and allied countries, often described by the media as a sort of “NATO of rare earths,” with the stated goal of reducing dependence on Beijing.
| Strategic Problem | Current Situation (China Share) | Current Situation (US/Allies Share) | Solution proposed in the article |
| Mining | ~60-70% | ~12-14% (USA), ~10% (Australia) | Opening of new mines and agreements with Australia/Vietnam. |
| Refining (Separation) | ~85-91% | < 5% (Mainly in Malaysia/Estonia) | MP Materials (USA) and Saskatchewan (Canada) plants. |
| Magnet Production | ~94% | ~1-2% | Incentives to bring magnet production back to the West. |
| Reserve Notes | ~48% (44 million tons) | ~2% (USA), ~6% (Australia) | Geological exploration in Greenland and Sweden. |
| Recycling Technology | Leader (Patent Domain) | < 5% (Embryonic stage) | Developing coordinated recycling systems between allies. |
According to Kyle Chan , senior fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, the recently signed agreements between the United States, Australia, and Japan signal a significant shift in direction. However, Chan emphasizes that dependence on China cannot be overcome quickly or completely , but only through a gradual process of diversification.
A similar analysis was proposed by Chen Kaixin, a scholar of Sino-US relations and Chinese technological development. In his opinion, building an alternative supply chain will take several years. In the short term, Washington could reduce risks by strengthening existing capabilities in partner countries like Australia. One example is the mining agreement signed by the US company MP Materials Corp, which, however, will require a long time to achieve full production expansion.
The challenges remain evident. John Helveston, associate professor at George Washington University, noted that, in the short term, the United States’ options for competing with China in the rare earths sector are limited, especially industrially and economically.
According to Zhang Lehan, the United States will continue to depend on Chinese imports for several years, making it essential to maintain stable trade relations in the short term. The long-term strategy should instead focus on cooperation with allies to develop processing facilities in other countries and offer incentives for refining investments, such as guaranteed purchase contracts.
This approach, however, also requires growing domestic demand, for example through the expansion of the electric vehicle and battery production sectors. Zhang notes that the Trump administration was going in the opposite direction, curbing the development of these sectors.
A further key insight comes from Liao Po-lin, associate professor at the National University of Science and Technology in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. Liao emphasizes how China’s leadership in rare earth technologies is the result of long-term investments and policies. Since 2015, with the 13th Five-Year Plan dedicated to rare earths, Beijing has prioritized recycling and optimization of production processes, building a comprehensive and integrated supply chain over time.
While companies like Australian company Lynas and Canada’s Saskatchewan Research Council have made advances in processing technologies, Liao said they are not yet able to quickly replace the Chinese supply chain.
For the United States, in addition to the technology gap, three main obstacles weigh: environmental regulations, the lack of economies of scale, and still underdeveloped recycling systems. Overcoming these limitations will require a coordinated effort and cross-sector support from governments and industry.
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